Deonna, Julien A.
London New York : Routledge, 2012.
Added to CLICnet on 08/30/2013
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Notes:
- The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction introduces and explores these questions in a clear and accessible way. The authors discuss the following key topics: the diversity and unity of the emotions the relations between emotion, belief and desire the nature of values the relations between emotions and perceptions emotions viewed as evaluative attitudes the link between emotions and evaluative knowledge the nature of moods, sentiments, and character traits. –Publisher’s website.
- Includes bibliographical references (p. [126]-133) and index.
- Homing in on the emotions: Phenomenology Intentionality Epistemology Emotions with the affective domain Conclusion — The diversity and unity of emotions: Positive and negative emotions Conscious and unconscious emotions Other distinctions Basic emotions Emotions: unity or diversity? Unity regained Conclusion — Emotions, beliefs, and desires: Emotions and beliefs The mixed theory The desire satisfaction/frustration approach Conclusion — Introducing values: Emotions and values Subjectivism about values Fitting attitude analysis Forms of value realism Conclusion — Emotions as value judgments: The evaluative judgment theory The add-on strategy Emotions as constructions Conclusion — Perceptual theories of the emotions: James’s theory Emotions as direct perceptions of values Emotions as indirect perceptions of values Conclusions — The attitudinal theory of emotions: Attitudes and contents Emotions as felt bodily attitudes Virtues of the theory Intentionality and phenomenology — Emotions and their justification: Why-questions: perceptions vs. emotions Value judgments and value intuitions Back to why-questions Justified emotions Bridging the gaps Conclusion — The nature and role of affective explanations: Moods and temperaments Character traits and sentiments Desires Limits on the negative epistemological role of motivational states A positive epistemological role for motivational states? Conclusion — The importance of emotions: From justified emotions to justified evaluative judgments Emotions and emotional sensitivity Emotions and understanding Conclusion.
- Translated from the French.
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Requested by Fuehrer, M